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A seldom recognized fundamental difficulty undermines the concept of individual “state”
in the present formulations of quantum statistical mechanics (and in its quantum infor-
mation theory interpretation as well). The difficulty is an unavoidable consequence of
an almost forgotten corollary proved by Schro¨dinger in 1936 and perused by Park, Am.
J. Phys. 36, 211 (1968). To resolve it, we must either reject as unsound the concept
of state, or else undertake a serious reformulation of quantum theory and the role of
statistics. We restate the difficulty and discuss a possible resolution proposed in 1976 by
Hatsopoulos and Gyftopoulos, Found. Phys. 6, 15; 127; 439; 561 (1976).
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1. Introduction
In 1936, Schro¨dinger1 published an article to denounce a “repugnant” but un-
avoidable consequence of the present formulation of Quantum Mechanics (QM)
and Quantum Statistical Mechanics (QSM). Schro¨dinger claimed no priority on
the mathematical result, and properly acknowledged that it is hardly more than a
corollary of a theorem about statistical operators that von Neumann proved five
years earlier.2
Three decades later, Park3 exploited von Neumann’s theorem and Schro¨dinger’s
corollary to point out quite conclusively an essential tension undermining the log-
ical conceptual framework of QSM (and of its Quantum Information Theory in-
terpretation as well). Twenty more years later, Park returned to the subject in
another magistral, but almost forgotten Ref. 4 in which he addresses the question
of “whether an observer making measurements upon systems from a canonical en-
semble can determine whether the systems were prepared by mixing, equilibration,
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or selection”, and concludes that “a generalized quantal law of motion designed
for compatibility with fundamental thermodynamic principles, would also provide
a means for resolving paradoxes associated with the characteristic ambiguity of
ensembles in quantum mechanics.”
Schro¨dinger’s corollary was “rediscovered” by Jaynes5,6 and Gisin,7 and general-
ized by Hughston, Jozsa, and Wooters8 and Kirkpatrick.9 Also some interpretation
has been re-elaborated around it,10–15 but unfortunately the original references
have not always been duly cited. The problem at issue in this paper, first raised in
Ref. 1, has been acknowledged “in passing” in innumerable other references (see,
e.g., Refs. 16, 17 and references therein), but none has to our knowledge gone so
deeply and conclusively to the conceptual roots as Refs. 3 and 4. For this reason
it is useful once in a while to refresh our memory about the pioneering conceptual
contributions by Schro¨dinger and Park. The crystal clear logic of their analyses
should not be forgotten, especially if we decide that it is necessary to “go beyond”.
Reference 1 has been cited by many others, but not about the problem we focus
on here, rather because it also contains pioneering contributions to the questions
of entanglement, EPR paradox and related nonlocal issues. References 1, 3 and 4
have often been cited also in relation to the projection postulate and the quantum
measurement problem.
The tension that Park vividly brings out in his beautiful essay on the “nature
of quantum states” is about the central concept of individual state of a system.
The present formulation of QM and the standard interpretation of QSM imply the
paradoxical conclusion that every system is “a quantum monster”: a single system
can be thought as concurrently being “in” two (and actually even more) different
states. We briefly review the issue below (as we have done also in Ref. 18), but we
urge everyone interested in the foundations of quantum theory to read the original
Refs. 3 and 4. The problem has been widely overlooked and is certainly not well
known, in spite of the periodic rediscoveries. The overwhelming successes of QM
and QSM understandably contributed to discourage or dismiss as useless any serious
attempt to resolve the nevertheless unavoidable fundamental difficulty.
Here, we emphasize that a resolution of the tension requires a serious re-
examination of the conceptual and mathematical foundations of quantum theory.
We discuss four logical alternatives. We point out that one of these alternatives
achieves a resolution of the fundamental difficulty without contradicting any of the
successes of the present mathematical formalism in the equilibrium realm where
it is backed by experiments. However, it requires an essentially new and differ-
ent re-interpretation of the physical meaning of such successes. Moreover, in the
nonequilibrium domain it opens to new discoveries, new physics compatible with
the second law of thermodynamics, without contradicting QM, and resolving the
Boltzmann paradox about irreversibility as well. Thermodynamics may thus play
once again a key role in a conceptual advancement19–27 which may prelude to un-
covering new physics about far non-equilibrium dynamics.28–32
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2. Schro¨dinger Park Quantum Monsters
In this section, we review briefly the problem at issue. We start with the seemingly
harmless assumption that every system is always in some definite, though perhaps
unknown, state. We will conclude that the assumption is incompatible with the
present formulation and interpretation of QSM/QIT. To this end, we concentrate
on an important special class of systems that we call “strictly isolated”. A system is
strictly isolated if and only if (a) it interacts with no other system in the universe,
and (b) its state is at all times uncorrelated from the state of any other system in
the universe.
The argument that “real systems can never be strictly isolated and thus we
should dismiss this discussion as useless at the outset” is at once conterproduc-
tive, misleading and irrelevant, because the concept of strictly isolated system is
a keystone of the entire conceptual edifice in physics, particularly indispensable to
structure the principle of causality. Hence, the strictly isolated systems must be
accepted, at least, as conceivable, in the same way as we accept within QM that
a vector in Hilbert space may represent a state of a system. Here we take as an
essential necessary requirement that, when applied to a conceivable system and in
particular to an isolated system, the formulation of a physical theory like QSM
must be free of internal conceptual inconsistencies.
In QM the states of a strictly isolated system are in one-to-one correspondence
with the one-dimensional orthogonal projection operators on the Hilbert space of
the system. We denote such projectors by the symbol P . If |ψ〉 is an eigenvector
of P such that P |ψ〉 = |ψ〉 and 〈ψ|ψ〉 = 1 then P = |ψ〉〈ψ|. It is well known
that different from classical states, quantum states are characterized by irreducible
intrinsic probabilities. We give this for granted here, and do not elaborate further
on this point.
Admittedly, the objective of QSM is to deal with situations in which the state of
the system is not known with certainty. Such situations are handled, according to
von Neumann2 (but also to Jaynes5,6 within the QIT approach) by assigning to each
of the possible states of the system an appropriate statistical weight which describes
an “extrinsic” (we use this term to contrast it with “intrinsic”) uncertainty as to
whether that state is the actual state of the system. The selection of a rule for a
proper assignment of the statistical weights is not of concern to us here.
To make clear the meaning of the words extrinsic and intrinsic, consider the
following non-quantal example. We have two types of “biased” coins A and B for
which “heads” and “tails” are not equally likely. Say that pA = 1/3 and 1− pA =
2/3 are the intrinsic probabilities of all coins of type A, and that pB = 2/3 and
1 − pB = 1/3 those of coins of type B. Each time we need a coin for a new toss,
however, we receive it from a slot machine that first tosses an unbiased coin C
with intrinsic probabilities w = 1/2 and 1 − w = 1/2 and, without telling us the
outcome, gives us a coin of type A whenever coin C yields “head” and a coin of
type B whenever C yields “tail”. Alternatively, we pick coins out of a box where
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50% coins of type A and 50% coins of type B have been previously mixed. It is
clear that for such a preparation scheme, the probabilities w and 1−w with which
we receive (pick up) coins of type A or of type B have “nothing to do” with the
intrinsic probabilities pA, 1− pA, and pB , 1− pB that characterize the biased coins
we will toss. We therefore say that w and 1 − w are extrinsic probabilities, that
characterize the heterogeneity of the preparation scheme rather than features of
the prepared systems (the coins). If on each coin we receive we are allowed only a
single toss (projection measurement ?), then due to the particular values (pA = 1/3,
pB = 2/3 and w = 1/2) chosen for this tricky preparation scheme, we get “heads”
and “tails” which are equally likely; but if we are allowed repeated tosses (non-
destructive measurements, gentle measurements, quantum cloning measurements,
continuous time measurements?) then we expect to be able to discover the trick.
Thus it is only under the single-toss constraint that we would not lose if we base
our bets on a description of the preparation scheme that simply weighs the intrinsic
probabilities with the extrinsic ones, i.e. that would require us to expect “head”
with probability phead = wpA + (1− w)pB = 1/2 ∗ 1/3 + 1/2 ∗ 2/3 = 1/2.
For a strictly isolated system, the possible states according to QM are, in prin-
ciple, all the one-dimensional projectors P on the Hilbert space H of the system.
Let P denote the set of such one-dimensional projectors on H. If we are really
interested in characterizing unambiguously a preparation scheme that yields states
in the set P with some probability density, we should adopt a measure theoretic
description as proposed in Ref. 18, and define a “statistical weight measure” µ satis-
fying the normalization condition µ(P) = ∫
P
µ(dP ) = 1 and such that the expected
value of an observable A (which on the base states is given by Tr(PA)) is given by
〈A〉 = ∫
P
Tr(PA)µ(dP ). As shown in Ref. 18, this description would not lead to
the kind of ambiguities we are led to by adopting the von Neumann description,
but it would not lead to the von Neumann density operator either.
Instead, following the von Neumann recipe, QSM and QIT assign to each state
Pi a statistical weight wi, and characterizes the extrinsically uncertain situation by a
(von Neumann) statistical operatorW =
∑
i wiPi, a weighted sum of the projectors
representing the possible states (W is more often called the density operator and
denoted by ρ, but we prefer to reserve this symbol for the state operators we define
in the next section).
The von Neumann construction is ambiguous, because the same statistical
operator is assigned to represent a variety of different preparations, with the only ex-
ception of homogeneous preparations (proper preparation in the language of Ref. 33)
where there is only one possible state Pψ with statistical weight 100% so that
W = W 2 = Pψ is “pure”. Given a statistical operator W (a non-negative, unit-
trace, self-adjoint operator on the Hilbert space of the system), its decomposition
into a weighted sum of one-dimensional projectors Pi with weights wi implies that
there is a preparation such that the system is in state Pi with probability wi. The
situation described by W has no extrinsic uncertainty if and only if W equals one
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of the Pi’s, i.e. if and only if W
2 = W = Pi (von Neumann’s theorem
2). Then,
QSM reduces to QM and no ambiguities arise.
The problem is that whenever W represents a situation with extrinsic un-
certainty (W 2 6= W ), then the decomposition of W into a weighted sum of
one-dimensional projectors is not unique. This is the essence of Schro¨dinger’s
corollary1 relevant to this issue (for a mathematical generalization see Ref. 9 and
for interpretation in the framework of nonlocal effects see e.g. Ref. 10).
For our purposes, notice that every statistical (density) operator W , when re-
stricted to its range Ran(W ), has an inverse that we denote by W−1. If W 6= W 2,
then Ran(W ) is at least two-dimensional, i.e. the rank of W is greater than 1. Let
Pj = |ψj〉〈ψj | denote the orthogonal projector onto the one-dimensional subspace
of Ran(W ) spanned by the jth eigenvector |ψj〉 of an eigenbasis of the restriction
of W to its range Ran(W ) (j runs from 1 to the rank of W ). Then, W =
∑
j wjPj
where wj is the jth eigenvalue, repeated in case of degeneracy. It is noteworthy
that wj = [TrRan(W )(W
−1Pj)]
−1. Schro¨dinger’s corollary states that, chosen an ar-
bitrary vector α1 in Ran(W ), it is always possible to construct a set of vectors |αk〉
(k running from 1 to the rank ofW , α1 being the chosen vector) which span Ran(W )
(but are not in general orthogonal to each other), such that the orthogonal projec-
tors P ′k = |αk〉〈αk | onto the corresponding one-dimensional subspaces of Ran(W )
give rise to the alternative resolution of the statistical operator W =
∑
k w
′
kP
′
k ,
with w′k = [TrRan(W )(W
−1P ′k)]
−1.
To fix ideas, consider the example of a qubit with the statistical operator given
by W = p|1〉〈1| + (1 − p)|0〉〈0| for some given p, 0 < p < 1. Consistently with
Schro¨dinger’s corollary, it is easy to verify that the same W can also be obtained
as a statistical mixture of the two projectors |+〉〈+| and |a〉〈a| where |+〉 = (|0〉+
|1〉)/√2, |a〉 = (|+〉 + a|−〉)/√1 + a2 (note that |a〉 and |+〉 are not orthogonal
to each other), |−〉 = (|0〉 − |1〉)/√2, a = 1/(1 − 2p) and w = 2p(1 − p) so that
W = w|+〉〈+| + (1− w)|a〉〈a|. With p = 1/4 this is exactly the example given by
Park in Ref. 3.
QSM forces on us the following interpretation of Schro¨dinger’s corollary. The
first decomposition of W implies that we may have a preparation which yields
the system in state Pj with probability wj , therefore, the system is definitely in
one of the states in the set {Pj}. The second decomposition implies that we may
as well have a preparation which yields the system in state P ′k with probability w
′
k
and, therefore, the system is definitely in one of the states in the set {P ′k}. As both
decompositions hold true simultaneously, the very rules we adopted to construct the
statistical operator W allow us to conclude that the state of the system is certainly
one in the set {Pj}, but concurrently it is also certainly one in the set {P ′k}. As
the two sets of states {Pj} and {P ′k} are different (no elements in common), this
would mean that the system “is” simultaneously “in” two different states, thus
contradicting our starting assumption that a system is always in one definite state
(though perhaps unknown). Little emphasis is gained by noting that, because the
December 12, 2006 11:56 WSPC/146-MPLA 02184
2804 G. P. Beretta
possible different decompositions are not just two but an infinity, we are forced to
conclude that the system is concurrently in an infinite number of different states!
Obviously such conclusion is unbearable and perplexing, but it is unavoidable within
the current formulation of QSM/QIT. The reason why we have learnt to live with
this issue – by simply ignoring it – is that if we forget about interpretation and
simply use the mathematics, so far we always got successful results that are in good
agreement with experiments.
Also for the coin preparation example discussed above, there are infinite ways to
provide 50% head and 50% tail upon a single toss of a coin chosen randomly out of
a mixture of two kinds of biased coins of opposite bias. If we exclude the possibility
of performing repeated (gentle) measurements on each single coin, then all such
situations are indeed equivalent, and our adopting the weighted sum of probabilities
as a faithful representation is in fact a tacit acceptance of the impossibility of making
repeated measurements. This limitation amounts to accepting that the extrinsic
probabilities (w, 1 − w) combine irreducibly with the intrinsic ones (pA, pB), and
once this is done there is no way to separate them again (at least not in a unique
way). If these mixed probabilities are indeed all that we can conceive, then we must
give up the assumption that each coin has its own possibly unknown, but definite
bias, because otherwise we are led to a contradiction, for we would conclude that
there is some definite probability that a single coin has at once two different biases
(a monster coin which belongs concurrently to both the box of, say, 2/3 – 1/3 biased
coins and to the box of, say, 3/4 – 1/4 biased coins).
3. Is There a Way Out?
In this section we discuss four main alternatives towards the resolution of the para-
dox, i.e. if we wish to clear our everyday, already complicated life from quantum
monsters. Indeed, even though it has been latent for fifty years and it has not im-
peded major achievements, the conceptual tension denounced by Schro¨dinger and
Park is untenable, and must be resolved.
Let us therefore restate the three main hinges of QSM which lead to the logical
inconsistency:
(1) a system is always in a definite, though perhaps unknown, state;
(2) states (of strictly isolated systems) are in one-to-one correspondence with the
one-dimensional projectors P on the Hilbert space H of the system; and
(3) statistics of measurement results from a heterogeneous preparation with extrin-
sic uncertainty (probabilities wi) as to which is the actual state of the system
among a set {Pi} of possible states is described by the statistical operator
W =
∑
i wiPi.
To remove the inconsistency, we must reject or modify at least one of these state-
ments. But, in doing so, we cannot afford to contradict any of the innumerable
successes of the present mathematical formulation of QSM.
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A first alternative was discussed by Park3 in his essay on the nature of quantum
states. If we decide to retain statements (2) and (3), then we must reject statement
(1), i.e. we must conclude that the concept of state is “fraught with ambiguities and
should therefore be avoided.” A system should never be regarded as being in any
physical state. We should dismiss as unsound all statements of this type: “Suppose
an electron is in state ψ . . . ” Do we need to undertake this alternative and therefore
abandon deliberately the concept of state? Are we ready to face all the ramifications
of this alternative?
A second alternative is to retain statements (1) and (2), reject statement (3) and
reformulate the mathematical description of situations with extrinsic uncertainty
in a way not leading to ambiguities. To our knowledge, such a reformulation has
never been considered. The key defect of the representation by means of statistical
operators is that it mixes irrecoverably two different types of uncertainties: the
intrinsic uncertainties inherent in the quantum states and the extrinsic uncertainties
introduced by the statistical description.
In Ref. 18, we have suggested a measure-theoretic representation that would
achieve the desired goal of keeping the necessary separation between intrinsic quan-
tal uncertainties and extrinsic statistical uncertainties. We will elaborate on such
representation elsewhere. Here, we point out that a change in the mathematical for-
malism involves the serious risk of contradicting some of the successes of the present
formalism of QSM. Such successes are to us sufficient indication that changes in
the present mathematical formalism should be resisted unless the need becomes
incontrovertible.
A third alternative is the QIT approach proposed by Jaynes5,6 and subsequent
literature. The paradox is bypassed (rather than resolved) by introducing an ad hoc
“recipe” whereby base states other than eigenstates of the statistical operator W
are to be excluded as unconceivable, based on the belief that they do not repre-
sent “mutually exclusive events”.34 We skip here the well-known details of the QIT
ad hoc recipe5,6 to obtain the maximal −Tr(W lnW ) statistical operator W which
should provide the “best, unbiased description” of the statistics of measurement
results. We need only point out, for the purpose of our discussion, that such recipe
leads to the correct physical results (i.e. canonical and grand-canonical thermody-
namic equilibrium distributions) only if (1) the experimenter is assumed to know
the value of the energy of the system, not of some other observable(s); (2) the
underlying pure components of the heterogeneous preparation are “mutually exclu-
sive” in the sense that they are the eigenvectors of the Hamiltonian operator of the
system. Then, QIT reduces to equilibrium QSM and expectation values are success-
fully computed (from the pragmatic point of view) by the formula 〈A〉 = Tr(AW )
where W = exp(−βH)/Tr[exp(−βH)] (or its grand-canonical equivalent).
However, from the conceptual point of view, the two ad hoc conditions just
underlined are in clear conflict with the purely subjective interpretation assumed
at the outset in the QIT approach, for they exclude choices that a truly unbiased
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experimenter has no reason to exclude a priori. In other words, the fact that such
conditions are necessary to represent the right physics, implies that they represent
objective (rather than subjective) features of physical reality. In particular, they
impose that among the many possible decompositions of the maximal −Tr(W lnW )
statistical operator W , which exist by Schro¨dinger’s corollary, the observer is al-
lowed to give a physical meaning only to the spectral decomposition, thereby being
forced by the recipe to an extremely biased perspective. So, by ignoring and by-
passing the Schro¨dinger–Park conceptual paradox, the QIT approach not only does
not resolve it, but it opens up additional conceptual puzzles. For example, what
should W be if the experimenter knows the value of a property other than energy,
or is to describe statistics from a heterogeneous preparation which is a mixture
of pure preparations corresponding to non-mutually-orthogonal QM states (non-
mutually-exclusive events)? From the application point of view, practitioners in
the chemical physics literature have devised successful modeling and computational
recipes based on constrained maximal entropy35,36 or rate-controlled constrained
maximal entropy37,38 in which the energy constraint is replaced by or comple-
mented with suitably selected other constraining quantities, e.g., configurational
averages35,36 or potentials globally characterizing a class of slow rate-controlling
reaction schemes.37,38 But the empirical success of these approaches, in our view,
corroborates the need for further discussions about the subjectivity-objectivity con-
ceptual dilemma which remains unresolved.
A fourth intriguing alternative has been first proposed by Hatsopoulos and
Gyftopoulos19–22 in 1976. The idea is to retain statement (1) and modify statement
(2) by adopting and incorporating the mathematics of statement (3) to describe
the true physical states, i.e. the homogeneous preparations, and at the same time
devoiding heterogeneous preparations (and, therefore, extrinsic statistics) of any
fundamental role. The defining features of the projectors P , which represent the
states for a strictly isolated system in QM, are: P † = P , P > 0, TrP = 1, P 2 = P .
The defining features of the statistical (or density) operators W are W † = W ,
W > 0, TrW = 1. Hatsopoulos and Gyftopoulos propose to modify statement (2)
as follows:
(2′) (HG ansatz) States (of every strictly isolated system) are in one-to-one corre-
spondence with the state operators ρ on H, where ρ† = ρ, ρ > 0, Tr ρ = 1,
without the restriction ρ2 = ρ. We call these the “state operators” to emphasize
that they play the same role that in QM is played by the projectors P , accord-
ing to statement (2) above, i.e. they are associated with the homogeneous (or
pure or proper) preparation schemes.
Mathematically, state operators ρ have the same defining features as the statis-
tical (or density) operators W . But their physical meaning according to statement
(2′) is sharply different. A state operator ρ represents a state. Whatever uncertain-
ties and probabilities it entails, they are intrinsic in the state, in the same sense as
uncertainties are intrinsic in a state described (in QM) by a projector P = |ψ〉〈ψ|. A
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statistical operator W , instead, represents (ambiguously) a mixture of intrinsic and
extrinsic uncertainties obtained via a heterogeneous preparation. In Refs. 19–22,
all the successful mathematical results of QSM are re-derived for the state oper-
ators ρ. There, it is shown that statement (2′) is non-contradictory to any of the
(mathematical) successes of the present QSM theory, in that region where theory is
backed by experiment. However, it demands a serious re-interpretation of such suc-
cesses because they now emerge no longer as statistical results (partly intrinsic and
partly extrinsic probabilities), but as non-statistical consequences (only intrinsic
probabilities) of the nature of the individual states.
In addition, statement (2′) implies the existence of a broader variety of states
than conceived of in QM (according to statement (2)). Strikingly, if we adopt state-
ment (2′) with all its ramifications, those situations in which the state of the system
is not known with certainty stop playing the perplexing central role that in QSM is
necessary to justify the successful mathematical results such as canonical and grand
canonical equilibrium distributions. The physical entropy that has been central in
so many discoveries in physics, would have finally gained its deserved right to enter
the edifice from the front door. It would be measured by −kBTr ρ ln ρ and, by way
of statement (2′), be related to intrinsic probabilities, differently from the von Neu-
mann measure −TrW lnW which measures the state of uncertainty determined by
the extrinsic probabilities of a heterogeneous preparation. We would not be any-
more embarrassed by the inevitable need to cast our explanations of single-atom,
single-photon, single-spin heat engines in terms of entropy, and entropy balances.
The same observations would be true even in the classical limit,25 where the
state operators tend to distributions on phase-space. In that limit, statement (2′)
implies a broader variety of individual classical states than those conceived of in
classical mechanics (and described by the Dirac delta distributions on phase-space).
The classical phase-space distributions, that are presently interpreted as statistical
descriptions of situations with extrinsic uncertainty, can be readily reinterpreted as
non-statistical descriptions of individual states with intrinsic uncertainty. Thus, if
we accept this fourth alternative, we must seriously reinterpret, from a new non-
statistical perspective, all the successes not only of quantum theory but also of
classical theory.
If we adopt the HG ansatz, the problem of describing statistics of measure-
ment results from heterogeneous preparations loses the fundamental role it holds
in QSM by virtue of statement (3). Nevertheless, when necessary, the problem can
be unambiguously addressed as follows18:
(3′) Preparations of a given system are in one-to-one correspondence with the nor-
malized measures µ that can be defined on the HG “quantal state domain of
the system”,R, i.e. the set of all possible state operators ρ on H defined accord-
ing to statement (2′) [the normalization condition is µ(R) = ∫
R
µ(dρ) = 1].
We call each such measure µ a “statistical-weight measure over the quantal
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phase-domain of the system”. Statistics of measurement results from a hetero-
geneous preparation with extrinsic uncertainty (probabilities wi) as to which
is the actual state of the system among a discrete set {ρi} of possible states
is described by the statistical-weight measure µ =
∑
i wiµρi where µρi is the
Dirac measure “centered” at state ρi.
a
The discussion of such description, first introduced in Ref. 18, is not essential here
and will therefore be presented elsewhere (recently, some useful mathematical re-
sults have been developed along these lines, but in another context, in Refs. 40
and 41). For the present purpose it suffices to say that the Dirac measures are the
only irreducible measures that can be defined over R.18 In fact, any other measure
can be decomposed in a unique way into a “sum” of Dirac measures and is there-
fore reducible. The physical meaning of the uniqueness of the “spectral” resolution
of any measure into its component Dirac measures is that the statistical descrip-
tor µ associated with any preparation is complete and unambiguous, because its
unique “spectral” resolution identifies unambiguously every component homoge-
neous preparation through the support of the corresponding Dirac measure, as well
as the respective statistical weight. As a result, this mathematical description of
heterogeneous preparations does not lead to the Schro¨dinger–Park paradox and
hence the concept of state is saved.b
4. Concluding Remarks
In conclusion, the Hatsopoulos–Gyftopoulos ansatz, proposed three decades ago
in Refs. 19–22 and follow up theory,23,26,27,30–32,42,43 not only resolves the
Schro¨dinger–Park paradox without rejecting the concept of state (a keystone of
scientific thinking), but forces us to re-examine the physical nature of the individ-
ual states (quantum and classical), and finally gains for thermodynamics and in
particular the second law a truly fundamental role, the prize it deserves not only
for having never failed in the past 180 years since its discovery by Carnot, but also
aAmong the measures that can be defined over R, with every state operator ρo in R we can
associate a Dirac measure defined as follows.18,39 Let E denote any subset of R, then µρo(E) = 1
if ρo ∈ E and µρo (E) = 0 if ρo /∈ E. The support of a measure is the subset of the domain R for
which the measure is nonzero. Clearly the Dirac measure µρi has a single-point support coinciding
with the state operator ρi.
bNotice that within standard QM, where states of strictly isolated systems are one-to-one with the
unit-norm vectors ψ in the Hilbert space H of the system, a natural and unambiguous description
of the statistics from a heterogeneous preparation can be obtained by using (instead of the von
Neumann statistical operator W ) the normalized statistical-weight measures µ defined on the
set of all possible unit-norm (pure state) vectors ψ in H. The uniqueness of the decomposition
µ =
∑
i wiµψi into the component Dirac measures (in the discrete case) or its continuous version
(Refs. 40 and 41) would not give rise to the Schro¨dinger–Park paradox. However, as we will show
elsewhere, the maximal-statistical-uncertainty measures that would correspond to thermodynamic
equilibrium according to standard QSM/QIT reasoning, would differ in general from the canonical
and grand canonical distributions!
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for having been and still being a perpetual source of reliable advise as to how things
work in Nature.
In this paper, we restate a seldom recognized conceptual inconsistency which is
unavoidable within the present formulation of QSM/QIT and discuss briefly logical
alternatives towards its resolution. Together with Schro¨dinger1 who first surfaced
the paradox and Park3,4 who first magistrally explained the incontrovertible tension
it introduces around the fundamental concept of state of a system, we maintain that
this fundamental difficulty is by itself a sufficient reason to go beyond QSM/QIT,
for we must resolves the “essential tension” which has sapped the conceptual foun-
dations of the present formulation of quantum theory for almost 80 years.
We argue that rather than adopting the drastic way out provokingly prospected
by Park, namely, that we should reject as unsound the very concept of state of
a system (as we basically do every day by simply ignoring the paradox), we may
alternatively remove the paradox by rejecting the present statistical interpreta-
tion of QSM/QIT without nevertheless rejecting the successes of its mathematical
formalism. The latter resolution is satisfactory both conceptually and mathemati-
cally, but requires that the physical meaning of the formalism be reinterpreted with
care and detail. Facing the situation sounds perhaps uncomfortable because there
seems to be no harmless way out, but if we adopt the Hatsopoulos–Gyftopoulos
fundamental ansatz (of existence of a broader kinematics) the change will be at
first mainly conceptual, so that practitioners who happily get results everyday out
of QSM would basically maintain the status quo, because we would maintain the
same mathematics both for the time-independent state operators that give us the
canonical and grand-canonical description of thermodynamics equilibrium states,
and for the time-dependent evolution of the idempotent density operators (ρ2 = ρ),
i.e. the states of ordinary QM, which keep evolving unitarily. On the other hand,
if the ansatz is right, new physics is likely to emerge, for it would imply that be-
yond the states of ordinary QM, there are states (“true” states, obtained from
preparations that are “homogeneous” in the sense of von Neumann2) that even
for an isolated and uncorrelated single degree of freedom “have physical entropy”
(−kB Tr ρ ln ρ) and require a non-idempotent state operator (ρ2 6= ρ) for their de-
scription, and therefore exhibit the limitations imposed by the second law even at
the microscopic level.
In addition, if we adopt as a further ansatz that the time evolution of these
non-ordinary-QM states (the non-idempotent ones) obeys the nonlinear equation
of motion developed by the present author,23,26,27,31,32,42,43 then in most cases they
do not evolve unitarily but follow a path that results from the competition of the
Hamiltonian unitary propagator and a new internal-redistribution propagator that
“pulls” the state operator ρ in the direction of steepest entropy ascent (maximal
entropy generation) until it reaches a (partially) canonical form (or grand canonical,
depending on the system). Full details can be found in Refs. 27 and 30.
The proposed resolution definitely goes beyond QM, and turns out to be in line
with Schro¨dinger’s prescient conclusion of his 1936 article1 where he writes: “My
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point is that in a domain which the present theory does not cover, there is room for
new assumptions without necessarily contradicting the theory in that region where
it is backed by experiment.”
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